We present an example of a symmetric quantum game for which a dynamically stable Nash equilibrium becomes unstable when the initial state used to play the quantum game is changed to 'entangled' from 'unentangled'. The game is played between two players via the proposed scheme of applying 'identity' and 'Pauli spin flip' operators on the initial state with classical probabilities.
Introduction
In a recent paper Eisert et al [1] have shown that when the players in a game have access to quantum strategies the game can give different Nash Equilibria (NE) that can give better payoffs. Marinatto and Weber [2] have proposed another interesting scheme to play a quantum game where players implement their 'tactics' by a probabilistic choice between applying the 'identity' and applying 'Pauli spin-flip' operator. In a quantized game there can rise multiple NE similar to classical game. For example classical version of Battle of Sexes give three NE and its quantization via Marinatto and Weber's scheme again give three NE. In classical game theory dynamical stability is one of essential criteria to select among multiple NE that are solutions to a game and it is usually considered with respect to some adjustment process that underlies the game. Selten [3] introduced the idea of perturbations in normal form classical games to get rid of unreasonable NE as solutions to these games by using a static procedure based on intuitive equilibrium conditions of NE. Replicator dynamic [10] [12] in evolutionary game theory is an adjustment process for which frequency of a particular strategy evolves according to its payoff relative to that of other strategies. For pure available classical strategies S 1 , ..., S n let the proportion of players of S i at a particular time be p i , (i = 1, ..., n), so that the average population strategy is the vector p = (p i ), with the expected payoff of an S i player being f i (p) and the overall expected payoff in the population being F (p) = p i f i (p). Then the replicator dynamic is defined by the differential equation [13] 
Thus the proportion of players which play the better strategies increase with time. The replicator dynamic is originally based on biological considerations but it has also found applications in Economics. In this paper we apply the dynamic stability criteria with respect to replicator dynamic to quantum games with multiple NE. Quantum games apart from finding applications in quantum information [4] have also been considered interesting from another perspective. Referring to Dawkin's 'Selfish Gene' [5] Eisert et al [1] hinted that games of survival are being played already on molecular level where quantum mechanics dictates the rules. Self replication of DNA molecules and synthesis of proteins which govern all the processes of a living molecule are two essential ways [11] where quantum information exchange can be said to play an important role. A consideration of quantum games in such situations seems a good reason to make these games interesting as indicated by Eisert et al [1] . A decision by a DNA molecule either to replicate itself or to synthesize protein can be imagined as a set of instructions that can formulated as a quantum strategy. How can, then, a DNA molecule be programmed to prepare a particular protein and not some other? How the molecule evolves and adapts a particular set of procedures that can be said to constitute a quantum strategy? Why the other strategies, leading to synthesis of a different protein for example, instead of the desired one are not successful? This brings to mind the notion of mutant strategy from ESS theory that tries to invade ESS but without success. Assuming life molecules in possession of many strategies out of which a few or just one is successful in the sense of its increased use with time. The notion of ESS derived from population biology problems but the concept remains valid even when, for example, there are just two players to play a bimatrix game. In that case the ESS will be a strategy the players will choose to play almost all the time and the fraction of the total time will replace the usual term called frequency that corresponds to fraction of the total population. The molecule deciding in favor of a particular set of steps out of many available options gives some reasons to consider perturbations in quantum games. Mutant strategies constituting perturbations in classical evolutionary game theory are not successful against the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and ESS appears as a stable strategy that cannot be invaded when mutants appear in small numbers. Underlying process in the definition of ESS is replicator dynamic based on Darwinian idea of 'survival of the fittest' leading to increase with time the frequency of a strategy giving better pay off. Replicator dynamic is a simple and theoretically attractive process that can have an intuitive appeal to be extended to quantum game like situations. Among the many possible quantum strategies that we assumed to be at the disposal of a life molecule the winning strategy, corresponding to synthesis of desired protein for example, can be imagined as a result of micro-level replicator dynamic that becomes responsible for the increased use of the winning stable strategy to such an extent that the molecule implements it almost all the time and mutant set of procedures resulting in undesirable synthesis cannot invade the stability coming out of replicator dynamic. In this perspective the use of replicator dynamic to select among many NE a special one corresponding to a stable solution, in quantum game like situations that we assumed to exist in molecules forming the basis of life does not seem a hypothesis far away from the mechanism existing in molecules to formulate and evolve established and stable procedures to perform their fundamental functions. An adjustment process having fruitful results both in population biology problems and economics is simple and intuitively appealing to form a mechanism to provide a reason for the existence of stable set of procedures and decisions in possession of molecules. Sets of decisions form quantum strategies and a quantum NE can be said to be a strategy with a potential to establish itself as a stable solution of the game.
We apply Marinatto and Weber's scheme [2] to a symmetric game between two players. A good reason to select this scheme is that the idea of a mixed NE and ESS can easily be given a meaning without introducing extra assumptions when the pure strategies of the quantized version of the game are taken as the implementation by the players of identity We then show how the 'entanglement' usually considered as a pure quantum phenomenon can be exploited to select and decide ESS in quantum version of a game satisfying a few requirements. The game we consider is symmetric similar to corresponding examples in evolutionary game theory where ESS is usually defined for symmetric pairwise contests. It has been shown recently [14] that for certain asymmetric quantum games between two players ESSs can be made to appear or disappear via a control over the initial state even when the corresponding strategies remain NE for those initial states. The ESS idea originally defined for symmetric games will be more interesting if entanglement is related in those games as well. Even for molecular level games referred to earlier the symmetric contests seems more appropriate and interesting.
Evolutionary Stability
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined by Smith and Price [6] with the motivation that a population playing the ESS can withstand a small invading group. They considered a symmetric game where the players are anonymous. Let P [x, y] be the payoff to a player playing x against the player playing y.Strategy x is an ESS if for any alternative strategy y, the following two requirements are satisfied:
(2) and in the case were condition 2 is satisfied as an equality:
Requirement 2 is in fact the Nash requirement and requires that no single individual can gain by unilaterally changing strategy from x to y. For a linear structure of the game the two requirements 2 and 3 are equivalent to that for any y = x there is a critical positive value such that if the frequency of the y-mutant strategists is lower than this value (while the rest of the population sticks to the strategy x), it is better for everyone to stick to majority strategy x, better being defined in terms of individual maximization of the payoff function P [7] [8].Thus, as ESS is a strategy which, if played by almost all members of a population, cannot be displaced by a small invading group playing any alternative strategy. An ESS will persist as the dominant strategy through time, so that strategies observed in the real world will tend to be ESSs [9] .ESS is dynamically stable with respect to replicator dynamic. For molecular level situations when replicator dynamic is taken as the underlying process the ESSs involving quantum strategies will similarly tend to be observed in real micro world.
A symmetric game
Consider following symmetric game between two players for two available classical strategies S 1 and S 2.
Let the constants of the matrix α, β, γ, σ satisfy the following conditions.
We take the initial quantum state to play the above game to be [2] :
The associated density matrix is [2] :
Where p and q be the probabilities of two players to act with the operator ∧ I. Payoff to a p player against a q player for the payoff matrix given by 4 is [2] :
The condition that makes (p ⋆ , p ⋆ ) a NE is given as:
For the strategy p ⋆ = 0 to be a NE we should have:
Classical payoffs are obtained when |b| 2 = 0 i.e. when the initial state becomes unentangled for which the payoff difference is given as:
Now p ⋆ = 0 is an ESS for this classical game because for all p, q ∈ (0, 1] we get P (0, 0) > P (p, 0). Consider now the following value of the parameter |b| 2 .
For which the payoff difference given by eq. 11 become identically zero i.e. P (0, 0) = P (p, 0) and p ⋆ = 0 remains a NE. Under the conditions given in eq. 5 the possible range of the parameter |b| 2 is 0 < |b| 2 < 1. For the value of |b| 2 fixed in eq. 13 we obtain:
Now P (0, q) < P (q, q) for all q ∈ (0, 1] and the second condition given by eq. 3 for an ESS is not satisfied. Therefore p ⋆ = 0 is a NE for both |b| 2 = 0 and
(γ−α)+(σ−β) but an ESS for only for |b| 2 = 0 i.e. the classical game.
Conclusion
We proposed replicator dynamic as a potential underlying process to find dynamically stable Nash equilibria (NE) in quantum games. Dynamic stability can be a refinement concept of NE in situations where multiple Nash equilibria arise as solutions to a quantum game. This idea can be interesting in game theoretic modelling of molecular interactions where quantum game theory has a potential to be fruitfully applied. ESSs of classical game theory are dynamically stable NE with respect to replicator dynamic. To show that ESSs of classical game theory can be interesting even in the quantum game theory we presented an example of a symmetric game played between two players via a scheme proposed recently by Marinatto and Weber [2] for which a strategy is an ESS when the initial quantum state used to play the game is unentangled but the strategy does not remain an ESS when the initial state becomes entangled even though the strategy remains a NE for both entangled and unentangled forms of the initial state and the game gives classical payoffs for unentangled initial state. This shows that entanglement which is usually considered a pure quantum phenomenon has a potential role to play in game theoretic modelling of molecular interactions especially from the point of view of dynamic stability of NE constituting solutions to a game.
